I. Introduction
In the last decade many emerging and transition countries passed competition laws and created competition agencies to enforce them. The importance given by these countries to competition policy is growing and parallels, sometimes with a lag, a process of liberalization and increasing private sector participation in the economy. Many recent international initiatives 2 in the area of competition policy, the collaboration of the European Commission with Accession countries, the multilateral programs by UNCTAD and OECD and the bilateral agreements signed by the United States show the growing interest in fostering the role of competition agencies and enhancing their capacity.
During 2003, the World Bank Institute sent a needs assessment questionnaire to 48 competition agencies in transition and emerging countries in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin
America. This questionnaire has many objectives, the most important being the identification of areas where competition agencies in emerging and transition countries need to invest in human capital. The performance of a competition agency depends on many variables, such as financial resources, independence and the legal and political environments. Although the combination of these variables and many others influences the outcomes of a competition agency, human capital endowment stands out as a key explanatory factor of performance. Despite the emphasis on training areas, the needs assessment questionnaire also provides valuable data about competition agencies' workload (mergers and anticompetitive conduct cases), personnel endowment and priority infrastructure sectors.
The World Bank Institute's needs assessment questionnaire complements other initiatives in the area of competition policy. For instance, in the in the last two years, the International Competition Network 3 conducted detailed questionnaires among its members to address specific competition policy areas (advocacy, merger procedures and competition policy implementation).
The OECD has also been involved in a series of capacity building initiatives and reviews of competition laws and policies. Important evidence and lessons can be drawn from this needs assessment questionnaire.
Responses clearly indicate that competition agencies consider the institutional set up phase to be accomplished and they currently need to improve their capacity to solve technically complex mergers and anticompetitive conduct cases. Usually, the most challenging cases are those that involve regulated infrastructure sectors that are operated by the private sector. Competition agencies consider that regulatory agencies as well as members of the judicial branch of government need to participate in competition policy courses to achieve an effective implementation of competition laws. As important as the lessons for the design of competition courses, the questionnaire provides a detailed picture of competition agencies' workload, personnel endowment and priority sectors. The view of competition authorities as a homogenous group across countries and regions can be strongly discarded. The analysis of the needs assessment questionnaire shows there are significant heterogeneities among competition agencies' mandates, exempted sectors, professional personnel endowment and capacity needs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the sample and responses received. Section III presents the results on the scope of competition laws, level of activity of competition agencies, personnel endowment and relevance of selected infrastructure sectors.
Some lessons for the design of training courses are introduced in section IV. Section V provides some policy implications and section 6 concludes.
II. Sample and responses received
The questionnaire was sent to 48 emerging and transition countries in Africa, Asia, 
III. Results: general questions a. Scope of competition laws
The responses show that in the majority of countries lawmakers granted exemptions to certain economic sectors. Some exemptions are permanent while others are temporary.
According to the responses, the latter are justified as being a concession granted to industries that need to adjust to a liberalization process. Unfortunately, no information was provided on the length of temporary exemptions. Competition laws include temporary and permanent exemptions in the three regions. Some of the exempted sectors are:
Permanent: agriculture, labor market, financial markets, state-owned monopolies, water and sanitation, land passenger transport, electricity.
Temporary: telecommunications, postal sector, railways, air transport.
Countries in LAC tend to have competition laws that apply to all sectors. This result differs from ECA and EAP where half of the countries that responded the questionnaire have some sectors excluded from the application of competition laws. 
b. Level of activity: mergers and acquisitions analyzed in the previous 12 months
This question gives an idea of the workload a competition agency has in the area of mergers. Figure 2 shows that competition agencies can be divided in two groups, one that had to analyze more than 50 mergers last year and the other that dealt with less than ten. In ECA, the majority of agencies had to consider more than 50 mergers while in LAC most of the competition agencies analyzed less than 10 mergers. In EAP, half of the responses indicated a workload of more than 50 mergers and half less than 10. Given the lack of correlation between the level of economic activity and the number of mergers analyzed by competition agencies, we can safely argue that the workload of a competition agency is more influenced by the legal requirements embedded in competition laws than by the size of the economy 9 .
c. Anticompetitive conduct cases filed in the previous 12 months 8 The R 2 in the graph is 0,10. This value is upward biased because we excluded an average sized country that handled more than 1,700 mergers. Including this country the R 2 would be 0,06. 9 A reinforcing factor of this result is the fact that no response is in the range "11-20 mergers" which would be the case if the size of the economy had a high explanatory power in the quantity of cases handled by a competition agency. 
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In general, competition agencies have deadlines to approve/disapprove or condition mergers and acquisitions. That is not the case when dealing with anticompetitive conduct cases, which usually take more time to solve. This question refers to how many new anticompetitive conduct cases entered, during the previous 12 months, the pool of cases to be solved by the competition agency. In ECA and LAC, most competition agencies received more than 20 new cases in the previous 12 months. In EAP competition agencies have to pass judgment for either too many or too few cases. The questionnaire does not provide the opportunity to disaggregate the responses by type of conduct (for instance bid-rigging, price fixing, market allocation, refusal to deal, predatory pricing, etc).
d. Personnel in competition agencies and productivity indicators
Do competition agencies have enough human resources? Are they over or under staffed?
The average of responses for each region illustrate significant differences in total personnel employed in competition agencies. Agencies in the East Asia and Pacific region have four times more personnel than competition agencies in Latin America. It is clear from the information about number of mergers and anticompetitive cases previously reported that the observed difference in personnel across regions can not be explained by the level of activity competition agencies have in each regions. That is, competition agencies in EAP do not handle four times more cases than agencies in LAC or two times more cases than agencies in ECA. Part of the difference in total average personnel between EAP and the other regions is caused by the fact that some competition agencies in EAP have broader mandates that include "unfair business practices", an area that requires significant personnel endowment. Anticipating important differences in personnel, the questionnaire disaggregated total personnel in three categories: professionals, administrative and temporary staff. Professionals were subdivided in lawyers, accountants and economists. As shown in figure 6, administrative personnel weights heavily in EAP competition agencies, accounting for almost 65 percent of total personnel. Administrative personnel is also the most important category in the LAC region.
Only in ECA there is more professional than administrative personnel. Lawyers and economists jointly account for 75, 45 and 30 percent of total personnel in ECA, LAC and EAP respectively. 
Figure 8 Anticompetitive Conducts per Lawyers and Economists
Anticompetitive conducts per lawyer Anticompetitive conducts per economist degree of private sector participation in the provision of infrastructure services combined with the fact that state-owned firms are usually exempted from competition laws.
On average, the telecommunications sector got the highest degree of relevance. The fast technological changes and the liberalization of this sector are bringing out new competition problems, most of them related to network access, pricing and market foreclosure. Electricity is a relevant area of work for competition agencies in the three regions, and face the same competition policy problems as the telecom sector; the unbundling between generation, transport and distribution of electricity services has created access problems in the market most prone to natural monopoly (transport) and concentration problems derived from mergers in the generation market For competition agencies in LAC, the priority seems to be all transport modes with special emphasis on domestic air transport, which was liberalized in most Latin American countries during the 1990s. The questionnaire had a long list of topics related to the most important areas of competition policy and respondents had to assign a value from six (very relevant) to one (not relevant) to each topic. In aggregate, responses convey a very clear message: competition agencies need to acquire technical knowledge in most of the areas strictly related to competition policy. When analyzing priorities, responses did not provide clear messages because most of the answers, in all regions, were rated 5 or 6. Even though the high ratings indicate that competition agencies recognize they need to improve their knowledge in many areas, they pose a problem because it is difficult to prioritize and determine focus areas. To address this problem, one question asked to rank the five most relevant topics, allowing the identification of priority areas. Competition agencies in the three regions need training on conceptual issues in competition policy. The term conceptual does not mean introductory topics. In this category, the questionnaire includes fundamentals of pricing and market structure, natural monopoly theory and competition, demand elasticity, product differentiation, concentration indices and definition of relevant markets for antitrust purposes. All of these topics require advanced knowledge of economic theory and empirical economics, with emphasis on econometrics 14 .
IV. Results: lessons for the design of training courses a. Priorities for training content and training methods
In ECA training priorities are in vertical and horizontal mergers while competition agencies in LAC consider vertical mergers to be a priority training topic as well but give more importance to anticompetitive conducts (predatory pricing, access to essential facilities, refusal to deal, reseal price maintenance, tie in sales). In EAP there is not a clear training priority; however, legal aspects of mergers appear as a training capacity need, which is not the case for ECA and LAC. Summarizing, in all regions there is a significant demand for training on substance, on how to solve day-to-day technically challenging cases.
The questionnaire asked respondents to identify methods they prefer to use in training their staff. Not surprisingly, the most preferred methods are practical and hands-on methods, particularly case studies. All other methods ranked quite high in the three regions, implying that
competition agencies are open and willing to experiment with a variety of training methods.
When asked which countries/regions would provide relevant case studies, most competition agencies indicated they prefer the European Commission or the United States rather than countries with similar legal regimes or countries that speak the same language 15 . In the case of ECA, the subset of countries in the category Accession Countries showed a clear preference for European Commission's cases, which is an expected response.
b. Target audience
Should competition courses be attended exclusively by competition agencies' personnel?
Would competition agencies like to expand the traditional audience of competition policy courses to include representatives from regulatory agencies, the judicial branch of government, NGOs that represent consumers' rights, economic consulting firms and law firms?
15 Competition agencies in LAC were an exception because they indicated that Spain is usually used as a best practice source.
The responses to this question express a clear message: competition agencies would like to include regulatory agencies and members of the judicial branch of government in competition policy training courses. The need to include them reflects the growing awareness of the complementarities among competition agencies, regulatory agencies and the judicial system to achieve an effective implementation of the competition laws. In emerging and transition countries, as well as in the developed countries, there is a growing concern about competition issues in network industries. Most of these industries, specially those providing infrastructure services, are regulated by a regulatory agency. Competition and regulatory agencies need to cooperate and work together to address common problems and challenges. The best way to foster a valuable cooperation is by sharing information and having a common set of technical knowledge that allows them to understand the work and challenges each other face.
At the same time, the responses were more hesitant when considering the inclusion of private sector lawyers, economic consulting firms and NGOs that protect consumers' rights. It seems competition agencies in ECA and EAP would be willing to accept the participation of private sector lawyers, economists and NGOs while competition agencies in LAC are clearly more reluctant to accept them. 
Yes No
With respect to professionals from within competition agencies, mid-level management and technical staff are the preferred audience rather than the heads of agencies. This reflects the presence of a strong demand for courses with technical content that can create day-to-day casesolving capacity to permanent staff in competition agencies.
There is not a clear preference for the duration of courses. Half of the respondents feel that one week is about right for training courses while the other half prefer two-week or even longer courses. This indicates that competition agencies are willing to train their professional staff, even if training requires that they be absent from their jobs for long periods of time.
Although the significant willingness to invest in human capital put into words by competition agencies is a very positive sign, it will be very difficult to meet these needs since almost all the respondents, when asked how much would the agency be willing to pay per training day, answered "this agency does not have enough budget for training". A possible criticism to this response is the lack of incentives competition agencies have to reveal their true willingness to pay. The World Bank is an important donor and a needs assessment questionnaire sent by this institution may be perceived as the first step for a free of charge course. It remains as a pending, and very difficult task, the identification of competition agencies' true willingness to pay for competition policy courses.
V. Policy Implications
From the analysis of the needs assessment questionnaire we can derive some policies that would foster the interaction and cooperation among competition agencies and improve their performance. It seems that some harmonization and convergence of objectives in competition laws should be achieved. This would facilitate the provision of help from competition agencies in developed countries -which have more resources and experience in competition issues-to competition agencies in emerging and transition countries. Besides, it would avoid potential conflicts between competition agencies when a merger calls for a definition of a relevant market greater than the geographical limits of a given country. This task is not easy, as laws evolve in different environments and respond to demands and pressures from many conflicting interest groups. Areas that need harmonization include: convenience of giving privileges to economic sectors (temporary or permanent exemptions), need to redefine the legal figure of "excessive prices" and time limits to pass judgment on mergers and acquisitions.
The interaction between regulators and competition agencies needs to be improved.
Competition and sector specific regulation laws need to clearly define jurisdictions over topics and set the mechanisms to improve the cooperation between regulators and competition agencies.
In order to be able to implement policy changes, the role of multilateral organizations (World Bank, UNCTAD, OECD, and others), networks of competition agencies (for instance, the International Competition Network) and competition agencies from developed countries is very important as they can provide experts, technical assistance and best practice cases.
VI. Conclusions
The responses to the competition policy needs assessment questionnaire provide valuable information about characteristics of competition agencies -personnel endowment, level of activity in mergers and anticompetitive conduct cases, sectors exempted from the competition laws, priority infrastructure services, and others. More importantly, responses provide valuable information to identify capacity needs and give a precise guideline for the design of competition policy courses. Responses confirmed the growing importance of competition policy issues in infrastructure services and the need to foster coordination between sector regulators and competition agencies.
The main findings can be summarizes as follows:
1) Design of competition policy courses: (a) content: competition agencies do not need introductory courses. That is, there is a significant demand for training on substance, on how to solve day-to-day technically challenging issues; (b) training methods: practical and hands-on are the preferred methods. Competition agencies indicated they prefer cases from the European Commission or the United States rather than those from countries with similar legal regimes or countries that speak the same language; (c) training audience: competition policy courses should be expanded to include members of the judicial branch of government and regulatory agencies.
Within competition agencies, mid-level management and technical staff rather than heads of agencies are the preferred audience; and (d) budget for training: although investment in human capital seems to be a priority and competition agencies recognize it is a necessary condition to improve performance, almost all responses indicated, when asked how much are they willing to pay for training courses, that "this agency does not have enough budget for training".
2) Priority infrastructure sectors: the telecom and electricity sectors are a priority across all regions. Transport is also a priority in LAC.
3) Workload: competition agencies across countries and regions have different mandates.
Some competition laws impose an ex-ante control of all mergers in the economy, while others set rules that lead the competition authority to review only a few mergers per year. This fact plus the lack of a strong relation between the size of the economy and the number of mergers per year allowed us to conclude that the workload of a competition agency is, to a great extent, determined by the competition laws.
4) Personnel: the average endowment of personnel in competition agencies varies significantly across regions. We defined and computed proxy productivity variables "mergers per lawyer (economist)" and "anticompetitive conduct cases per lawyer (economist)". However, no clear conclusion can be obtained because a labor productivity variable for competition agencies cannot ignore the quality dimension, that is, the inherent varying complexity of mergers and anticompetitive conduct cases.
It must be highlighted that competition advocacy, an area where competition agencies are investing more time and financial resources, was explicitly not included in the questionnaire.
Given that The International Competition Network conducted during 2002 a detailed questionnaire on this topic, 16 we considered it was not appropriate to ask competition agencies to respond to two questionnaires on the same topic. Provided competition advocacy implies a broader and more general role for competition agencies -as they intervene in areas like design of regulatory frameworks, trade liberalization, and state aid-it must be included in the design of competition policy courses. 
